Scene construction in amnesia: an FMRI study by Mullally SL et al.
 Newcastle University ePrints 
 
 
Mullally SL, Hassabis D, Maguire EA. Scene construction in amnesia: an FMRI 
study. Journal of Neuroscience 2012, 32(16), 5646-5653. 
 
Copyright: Copyright © 2012 the authors 
The definitive version of this article, published by the Society for Neuroscience, 2012 is available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5522-11.2012  
Always use the definitive version when citing. 
 
Date deposited:  28th August 2014 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 
Unported License 
 
 ePrints – Newcastle University ePrints 
http://eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Behavioral/Systems/Cognitive
Scene Construction in Amnesia: An fMRI Study
Sine´ad L. Mullally,1Demis Hassabis,2 and Eleanor A. Maguire1
1Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, WC1N 3BG, United Kingdom, and 2Gatsby
Computational Neuroscience Unit, University College London, London, WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom
In recent years, therehasbeen substantial interest inhow thehumanhippocampusnot only supports recollectionof past experiences, but
also the construction of fictitious and future events, and the leverage thismight offer for understanding the operatingmechanisms of the
hippocampus.Evidence thatpatientswithbilateral hippocampaldamageandamnesia cannot constructnovel or future scenes/eventshas
been influential in driving this line of research forward. There are, however, some patients with hippocampal damage and amnesia who
retain the ability to construct novel scenes. This dissociation may indicate that the hippocampus is not required for scene construction,
or alternatively, there could be residual function in remnant hippocampal tissue sufficient to support the basic construction of scenes.
Resolving this controversy is central to current theoretical debates about the hippocampus. To investigate, we used fMRI and a scene
construction task to test patient P01, who has dense amnesia,50% bilateral hippocampal volume loss, and intact scene construction.
We found that scene construction in P01 was associated with increased activity in a set of brain areas, including medial temporal,
retrosplenial, and posterior parietal cortices, that overlapped considerably with the regions engaged in control participants performing
the same task. Most notably, the remnant of P01’s right hippocampus exhibited increased activity during scene construction. This
suggests that the intact scene construction observed in some hippocampal-damaged amnesic patients may be supported by residual
function in their lesioned hippocampus, in accordance with theoretical frameworks that ascribe a vital role to the hippocampus in scene
construction.
Introduction
The hippocampus plays a pivotal role in supporting autobio-
graphical memory (Scoville and Milner, 1957). In recent years,
the importance of the hippocampus has been amplified with the
suggestion it also enables the imagining of fictitious and future
experiences (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007, 2009; Schacter and
Addis, 2007). This idea stems from observations that hippocampal-
damaged amnesic patients are unable to construct spatially co-
herent fictitious or future scenes/events (Tulving, 1985; Tulving
et al., 1988; Klein et al., 2002;Hassabis et al., 2007a; Rosenbaumet
al., 2009; Andelman et al., 2010; Race et al., 2011; Mullally et al.,
2012). This finding is supported by numerous fMRI studies that
have documented hippocampal engagement in healthy volun-
teers when constructing fictitious or future scenes (Okuda et al.,
2003; Addis et al., 2007a; Hassabis et al., 2007b; Szpunar et al.,
2007).
Collectively, this evidence has generated substantial interest
and led to the further observation that a distributed set of brain
regions that includes the hippocampus is activated in common
during recollection of autobiographical experiences, construc-
tion of fictitious/future scenes, and spatial navigation (Buckner
and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Schacter and
Addis, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009). Moreover, several new theories
have been advanced to account for the role of this network in
supporting these disparate cognitive functions, all of them em-
phasizing the crucial role of the hippocampus. For example, the
scene construction theory posits that this set of brain areas, and
the hippocampus in particular, facilitates the construction of
complex spatial contexts or scenes into which event details are
bound, and this scene construction process is common to epi-
sodic memory, imagination, and navigation (Hassabis and
Maguire, 2007; for another account, see Schacter and Addis,
2007). Thus,much is currently invested in using the construction
of fictitious/future scenes as leverage to investigate the funda-
mental operating mechanisms of the hippocampus.
At odds with this view is patient P01 in Hassabis et al.’s
(2007a) study [P01 is also known as KN (McKenna andGerhand,
2002; Aggleton et al., 2005)], who could construct fictitious and
personal future scenes despite being densely amnesic (Fig. 1).
Other cases have since been reported (Squire et al., 2010, but see
Maguire and Hassabis, 2011; see also Maguire et al., 2010a; Coo-
per et al., 2011; Hurley et al., 2011). This preserved scene con-
struction ability may be evidence of its nonreliance on the
hippocampus (Squire et al., 2010). Alternatively, in some patients
there may be residual function in remnant hippocampal tissue
sufficient to support basic scene construction (Hassabis et al.,
2007a; Maguire et al., 2010a; Cooper et al., 2011; Hurley et al.,
2011). Resolving this controversy is central to current theoretical
debates about the hippocampus. A missing piece of key evidence
that could help to adjudicate is the direct examinationusing fMRI
of amnesic patients where scene construction ability is preserved.
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If theories such as scene construction are correct, then residual
hippocampal tissue should be engaged in such patients when they
construct novel scenes. To investigate this, we used fMRI and a
scene construction task to test patient P01, Hassabis et al.’s
(2007a) original anomalous patient, who had dense amnesia and
50% bilateral hippocampal volume loss.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Patient P01, who was 51 years old at the time of testing, has
been described in detail previously (McKenna andGerhand, 2002; Aggle-
ton et al., 2005; Hassabis et al., 2007a). To summarize, this male, right-
handed former industrial biochemist contracted meningeo-encephalitis
in 1993 at the age of 34 and then recurrentmeningitis.Hewas left without
useful motor function below T12, loss of vision in the lower visual field,
and severe amnesia. While his structural MRI scans showed bilateral
abnormalities in the occipital lobes, the main locus of volume reduction
was in the hippocampi [reduced by 48.8% on the left and 46.2% on the
right; Fig. 1 (Aggleton et al., 2005)]. This reduced hippocampal volume
was noted along the anterior–posterior axis of both the left and right
hippocampi, coupled with evidence of shortening along this axis, partic-
ularly at the head of the hippocampi (Aggleton et al., 2005; their Fig. 2).
On formal neuropsychological tests, P01’s full-scale IQwas in the high
average range [113, measured by the Weschler Test of Adult Reading
(Weschler, 2001)]. He performed normally on tests of language [95th
percentile, measured by the Category Specific Names Test (McKenna,
1997)], executive function [measured by the Behavioral Assessment of
theDysexecutive Syndrome (BADS): Rule Shift Cards subtest 1 error; the
Action Programme subtest 0 errors; the Key Search Test subtest 0 errors;
and a verbal fluency task where he generated 17 words beginning with ‘s’
in 1 min], and working memory (98th percentile; Table 1). Visual per-
ception was tested using the Visual Object and Space Perception Battery
(Warrington and James, 1991). Despite his lower visual field deficit, his
visuospatial appreciation was entirely unimpaired (Number Location
subtest  20/20). His shape perception appeared mildly impaired, but
otherwise he performed in the mid-to-low range of normal: Incomplete
Letter subtest 14th percentile; Progressive Silhouettes subtest 54th per-
centile; Number Location subtest 23 rd percentile.
While P01 retained the ability to acquire some new semantic informa-
tion (McKenna and Gerhand, 2002), his anterograde memory for epi-
sodic informationwas grossly impaired. This deficit was evident from the
initial assessments performed 4 months postillness, during extensive re-
assessment in 1998 (McKenna and Gerhand, 2002), and again in 2003
(Aggleton et al., 2005). At each of these time points, P01’s scores consis-
tently revealed severe impairment across a range of memory tasks, and
specifically on the recall components. Table 1 summarizes his memory
scores from 2003 on the Wechsler Memory Scale III (Wechsler, 1997),
Warrington Recognition Memory Test (Warrington, 1984), and the
Doors and People Test (Baddeley et al., 1994). The apparent sparing
of P01’s recognition memory compared with his very impaired recall
is discussed in detail in Aggleton et al. (2005). Finally, P01’s retro-
grade memory for autobiographical events was grossly impaired
across four decades, with virtually no reliable recollections (as veri-
fied by his spouse), while his retrograde memory for personal and
general semantics was intact. Notably, P01’s neuropsychological sta-
tus has remained very stable over the years and at the time of the
current study his spouse reported no change to either his anterograde
or retrograde amnesia.
Our aim was to examine P01 as a rare single case to ascertain whether
his preserved ability to construct fictitious scenes was accompanied by
engagement of his remnant hippocampal tissue during fMRI. While this
was our central motivation, we also took the opportunity to perform
some additional exploratory comparisons between P01 and a group of
control participants to examine the wider set of brain areas engaged
during scene construction. These controls had a similar background (i.e.,
university educated), performed the same tasks, in the same MRI scan-
ner, using the same image acquisition parameters, and identical data
analysis protocol to that used with P01. Results from these control par-
ticipants were reported previously by Hassabis et al. (2007b). The con-
trols were younger than P01 [n 21; 10 males; mean age 24.8 years (SD
3.8); age range, 18–31 years], so any comparisons should be treated with
caution. We hypothesized there would be no differences between the
controls and P01 in terms of the wider set of brain areas activated given
that he, like the controls, was unimpaired at scene construction.
Figure 1. Patient P01. A, A coronal view from P01’s MRI brain scan. B, Scores on the Experi-
ential Index (ameasure of the overall richness of the imagined scenes). C, Scores on the Spatial
Coherence Index (ameasure of the spatial contiguousness of the imagined scenes). Data is from
the Hassabis et al. (2007a) scene construction task. Each dot represents the data point of a
hippocampal-damaged amnesic patient (n 5), and the 10matched control participants. The
data point for P01 is marked with an arrow. Vertical bars signify means for each group. P01 is
clearly an outlier, performing similarly to the controls and significantly better than the other
hippocampal-damaged amnesic patients.
Table 1. P01’s performance on standardmemory tests
Score Percentile
Wechsler Memory Scale III
Auditory immediate 77 6
Visual immediate 61 0.5
Immediate memory 63 1
Auditory delayed 52 0.1
Auditory recognition delayed 80 9
General memory 57 0.2
Working memory index 131 98
Warrington Recognition Memory Test
Words 48/50 75
Faces 37/50 5
The Doors and People Test
Recognition: names 17 25
Recognition: doors 19 25–75
Recall: people 12 1
Recall: shapes 22 1
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Tasks and procedure.We used the tasks of Hassabis et al. (2007b) with
three minor adaptations to assist the patient: the scenario cue appeared
on the screen throughout the visualization period, accompanied by the
words “You should now be imagining [cue],” in case the patient opened
his eyes and could not recall the task (Fig. 2). Similarly, for the ratings,
instead of one-word cues being used (e.g., “Difficulty?”), a full question
was used (“How difficult was that?”), with an extra 0.5 s added per rating
to allow for additional reading. Just two of the experimental tasks were
included from the original Hassabis et al. (2007b) protocol, namely,
imagining scenes and single acontextual objects for the first time in the
scanner. The other tasks (recall of autobiographical memories/objects
and recall of previously imagined scenes/objects) could not be included
given P01’s amnesia.
The two main experimental conditions (the object condition and the
scene condition) had 20 trials each. A baseline control condition was also
included (10 trials). This yielded a total of 50 trials, which were presented
across three scanning sessions. Before scanning, P01 received extensive
training to ensure he was thoroughly familiarized with all aspects of the
task, including task cues, instructions, timings, and key presses, and to
confirm that he could retain the instructions during the scanning session.
Training included how to imagine the single, novel objects in the mind’s
eye (in response to an on-screen cue, e.g., “imagine a spool of bright
green thread”), in isolation and against a blank background. The novel,
fictitious scenes (e.g., “imagine standing on a crowded platformof a train
station”) were to be as vivid and life-like as possible, and he was in-
structed to imagine all of the aspects of the scenes (such as the surround-
ing environment, how it looked, felt, smelled, and sounded).
Throughout the training session, emphasis was placed on constructing
novel objects and scenes, and not simply evoking memories of familiar
objects or scenes. In the baseline condition, P01 had to imagine a white
cross on a black background. Again, detailed instructions and multiple
practice trials were given to ensure that he was able to confidently adhere
to task requirements.
The trial structure was as follows. The trial cue remained on screen for
5.5 s andwas then replaced by a “close your eyes and imagine” instruction
(Fig. 2). At this point, P01 was instructed to close his eyes immediately
and begin visualizing the scene or object as vividly as possible. During the
16 s visualization period, he was required to focus on the scene or object
he was imagining, adding more details if necessary. A 1 s audio tone
signaled the end of the visualization period (at which point he had to
openhis eyes) and the start of the ratings phase.Using anMR-compatible
five-button keypad, P01 scored his just-visualized scene or object across
four ratings: difficulty [how difficult was that: 1 (very easy)–5 (very
hard)], vividness [salience of the imagery: 1 (not vivid)–5 (very vivid)],
spatial coherence [contiguousness of the spatial context: 1 (an isolated
object)–5 (a contiguous scene)], andmemory [howmuch like amemory
the visualized scene or object was: 1 (nothing at all like a memory)–5
(exactly like a memory)]. He had 5 s to respond for each rating. This was
followed by a 1 s period of rest before the cue for the next trial was
presented. The spatial coherence rating provided an important internal
check, enabling us to verify that P01 had retained the task cue throughout
the trial (i.e., if the trial was an object trial, then it should be rated as an
isolated object, whereas if the cue described a scene, then the trial should
be rated higher and be considered a contiguous scene). The baseline
control condition was followed by one rating [i.e., “how focused on the
cross did you manage to stay”: 1 (not at all focused)–5 (very focused)].
Key task instructions were reinforced between each of the scanning
sessions.
Immediately following scanning, P01 was asked what he had been
doing during scanning, and was able to report the task instructions cor-
rectly. Three of the scene cues and three of the object cues were then
presented to P01, one at a time, and he was asked to imagine them this
time out loud to test that his scene construction ability was intact. Hewas
then asked to describe how he went about constructing a scene in his
mind’s eye.Hewas also probed about howdifficult and effortful he found
scene construction.
Behavioral data analysis. Data are presented as mean values  SD.
Statistical significance was calculated by looking at differences in the
ranked position order of P01’s ratings for the scene trials and the object
trials (Mann–Whitney U test). All tests performed were two-tailed and
differences were considered statistically significant at p 0.05.
Scanning parameters and preprocessing. T2*-weighted echo planar im-
ages (EPI) with blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) contrast were
acquired on a 1.5 tesla Siemens AG Sonata MRI scanner. Scanning pa-
rameters were selected to achieve whole-brain coverage: 45 oblique axial
slices angled at 30° in the anterior–posterior axis, 2 mm thickness (1 mm
gap), repetition time 4.05 s, slice time 90 ms, TE 50 ms, field of view 192
mm, 64 64matrix, in-plane resolution 3 3mm. The first six dummy
volumes from each session were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration
effects. Field maps were acquired with a standard manufacturer’s double
echo gradient echo field map sequence (short TE, 10 ms; long TE, 14.76
ms; whole-brain coverage; voxel size, 3  3  3 mm). A T1-weighted
structural scan was also acquired with 1 mm isotropic resolution. Data
were analyzed using the statistical parametric mapping software SPM8
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The Hassabis et al. (2007b) control partic-
ipants’ data were reanalyzed in SPM8 to allow for direct comparisonwith
the data of P01. Spatial preprocessing consisted of realignment and un-
warping (using field maps), normalization to a standard EPI template in
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space with a resampled voxel size
of 3 3 3mm, and smoothing using a Gaussian kernel with full width
at half maximum of 8 mm.
fMRI data analysis. After preprocessing, statistical analysis was per-
formed using the general linear model. The experiment had two main
imagining conditions (i.e., objects and scenes) and one baseline control
(fixation cross) condition. Wemodeled the time period from the start of
the visualization period (i.e., from the “close your eyes and imagine” cue)
until the end of the visualization period as a boxcar function of 16 s
duration. This was convolvedwith the canonical hemodynamic response
function to create regressors of interest. P01’s movement parameters
were included as regressors of no interest and the subject-specific param-
eter estimates pertaining to each regressor (betas) were calculated for
each voxel. First level contrasts were performed on these parameter esti-
mates. As in Hassabis et al. (2007b), we report the fMRI results at a
voxel-level threshold of p  0.001 whole-brain uncorrected (minimum
cluster size of five voxels). We report all areas activated at this threshold.
A formal comparison of P01’s fMRI data with that of the control
participants was also performed. As this analysis sought to compare ac-
tivity in a single patient to that observed in a group of participants (n
21), we adapted a statistical approach designed for the comparison of a
single case in neuropsychology to a reasonably small sample of control
Figure 2. Timeline of an example scene construction trial from P01’s fMRI study. See Materials and Methods for full details.
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participants, i.e., amodified t test (Crawford andHowell, 1998; Crawford
and Garthwaite, 2002). This treats an individual patient as a sample, and
was implemented in SPMusing a two-sample t test in which the variance
associated with the controls and P01 was assumed to be equal.
Results
Behavioral data
Ratings
During scanning, after each visualization period, P01 rated the
imagined objects and scenes on a five-point scale for four mea-
sures (difficulty, vividness, coherence, and similarity to a mem-
ory). In terms of trial difficulty, there was no difference between
scene and object trials (object trials:mean 1.4, SD 1.23; scene
trials: mean 1, SD 0.0;U 180, Z1.43, p 0.15), with
both being performed easily. P01 was able to imagine objects and
scenes with equal and high vividness (object trials: mean  5,
SD 0; scene trials: mean 4.95, SD 0.22;U 190, Z 0.32,
p  0.32). Importantly, P01 rated the scene trials as coherent
scenes (mean 5, SD 0.0) and the object trials as significantly
less scene-like (mean  1, SD  0.0; U  0, Z  6.25, p 
0.001), suggesting that he had retained the task instructions and
Figure 3. An excerpt from P01’s performance on the scene construction task. Below is an excerpt from an age-, sex-, and IQ-matched control participant for the same scene.
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was able to recall the cue beyond the 16 s visualization period. P01
rated his constructed scenes and imagined objects as relatively
dissimilar from actualmemories (object trials: mean 1.4, SD
1.23; scene trials: mean  2.9, SD  2.01), with the scene trials
being rated as more like a memory than the object trials (U
98, Z2.76, p 0.05). Finally, P01 reported maintaining a
good level of focus throughout the baseline trials (mean 
3.86, SD  1.46).
Debriefing
Three of the scene cues and three of the object cues were pre-
sented to P01 after scanning and, one at a time, and he was asked
to imagine them out loud. His performance, just as it had been
when tested by Hassabis et al. (2007a) (Fig. 3), was excellent,
confirming the preserved nature of his scene construction. P01
noted that “most of the scene comes in one shot” and described
the addition of the extra details as akin to “coloring in a color
book.”He noted that he does not find scene construction a diffi-
cult or effortful process but something that comes quite naturally
to him. However, he was unable to remember the constructed
scenes even shortly afterward, so that if he was given the same cue
again, he constructed an entirely new scene, and was unable to
verify whether it had any resemblance to the previously con-
structed scene (for a similar finding, see Cooper et al., 2011).
Neuroimaging data
To appreciate the brain areas engaged when P01 constructed
novel fictitious scenes, we compared activity associated with the
imagination of these scenes relative to the imagination of single
acontextual objects (i.e., scenes objects). Increased activity lev-
els were observed in the right hippocampus, right parahippocam-
pal gyrus, left retrosplenial cortex, and bilateral posterior parietal
cortex (Table 2; Fig. 4A). This analysis therefore revealed many
components of the scene constructionnetworkpreviously identified
in a set of 21 healthy control participants performing the same tasks
(Table 2; Fig. 4B) (Hassabis et al., 2007b). Most notably, and of
central concern in this study, the remnant of P01’s right hippocam-
pus was clearly engaged during scene construction.
As noted above, P01 rated the scene trials as significantlymore
like memories than the object trials. However given P01’s severe
amnesia, we believe it unlikely that his ratings on this question
actually mean that the scene trials included a significant memory
component. However, to explicitly rule this out, we reanalyzed
the fMRI data using only the trials that P01 rated as “nothing at all
like a memory.” Despite the reduced power associated with this
analysis, we continued to observe robust activation within P01’s
right hippocampus (33, 28, 14; Z  3.66; p  0.001 whole-
brain uncorrected), indicating that any potential episodic recall
associated with the scene trials (no matter how unlikely) was not
driving the activity in P01’s right hippocampus.
We performed some additional exploratory analyses compar-
ing P01 to a group of (younger) control participants. To identify
which of P01’s activation clusters lay within the controls’ scene
construction network, we created a mask of the data acquired
from the controls in the Hassabis et al. (2007b) study (for the
same contrast: newly imagined fictitious scenes  newly imag-
ined objects; Fig. 4B). When P01’s data were overlaid on the
controlmask, as anticipated, this illustrated the similar pattern of
results between the set of regions supporting P01’s scene con-
struction and that of controls (Fig. 5) in right parahippocampal
gyrus, left retrosplenial cortex, and bilateral posterior parietal
cortex. P01’s right hippocampal activity, which is clearly evident
(Fig. 4A), did not overlap with control participants’ cluster of
activity in right hippocampus.However, this observationmust be
considered in the context of P01’s gross hippocampal atrophy
(46.2% volume loss along the length of the right hippocampus)
and shortening at the anterior end, which renders it difficult to
draw comparison between the locations of activity within P01’s
damaged right hippocampus and that observed in the hip-
pocampi of healthy controls.
We also directly compared the data of P01 with that of the
controls from Hassabis et al. (2007b). In line with the overlap
analysis above, P01 activated a region of the right hippocampus
more than the control participants (26,28,11,Z 3.27), and
not any other regions. The controls did not activate any brain
areas more than P01. This shows that P01, like control partici-
pants (and despite their younger age), activated the wider net-
work for scene construction, even if some areas did not reach the
statistical threshold of p  0.001 in the original analysis (Fig. 4;
Table 2). Indeed when a more liberal threshold (p 0.005) was
applied to P01’s data, areas such as ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (3, 47,17; Z 2.94), evident in controls but not initially in
P01, begin to emerge.
Hassabis et al. (2007b) also reported the brain regions that
showed increased activity for imagining single acontextual ob-
jects compared with scenes, and these included lateral occipital
cortex bilaterally, intraparietal sulcus bilaterally, and right lateral
Table 2. fMRI results
Region Peak coordinate (x, y, z) Z
P01
Scenes Objects
Right superior frontal sulcus 18, 59, 19 3.41
Right hippocampus 36,28,14 4.73
Right parahippocampal gyrus 33,46,5 4.52
Left retrosplenial cortex 15,58, 16 3.83
9,61, 10 3.29
Right posterior parietal cortex/angular gyrus 45,70, 28 3.76
39,82, 31 3.32
Left posterior parietal cortex/angular gyrus 33,85, 37 5.76
Objects Scenes
Right lateral prefrontal cortex 48, 44, 28 3.49
Right intraparietal sulcus 51,40, 52 4.21
Left intraparietal sulcus 54,40, 40 3.87
Right lateral occipital cortex 48,52,17 4.53
Left lateral occipital cortex 51,70,11 4.71
Control participants*
Scenes Objects
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 3, 24,9 4.27
Right superior frontal sulcus 27, 27, 45 4.42
Right middle temporal cortex 57,6,24 3.70
Right hippocampus 21,24,12 3.86
Left parahippocampal gyrus 18,36,15 4.28
Right parahippocampal gyrus 33,42,12 4.43
Left retrosplenial cortex 12,60, 9 6.08
Right retrosplenial cortex 12,57, 15 5.52
Right precuneus 9,57, 48 3.91
Left posterior parietal cortex 48,78, 24 4.75
Right posterior parietal cortex 45,66, 24 4.75
Medial posterior parietal cortex 9,75, 57 4.73
Objects Scenes
Right lateral prefrontal cortex 42, 50, 19 3.78
Right intraparietal sulcus 51,31, 43 4.74
Left intraparietal sulcus 54,31, 43 5.30
Right lateral occipital cortex 42,64,8 4.01
Left lateral occipital cortex 45,67,8 4.29
p 0.001 (uncorrected). *Data fromHassabis et al. (2007b). Note that theObjects Scenes contrast reported here
for the control participants unlike the contrast reported in Hassabis et al. (2007b)	 is restricted to items newly
imagined in the scanner, in order to be identical to the tasks performed by P01.
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prefrontal cortex (Table 2). We also examined this contrast in
P01 and found that the same areas were engaged (Table 2). This
further underscores the similarity of P01’s activation patterns to
those of the controls, even though they were younger.
Discussion
Most patients with bilateral hippocampal damage and dense am-
nesia cannot construct fictitious or future scenes. This makes the
rare patients who retain this ability of theoretical importance.
The aim of this study was to examine such
a patient, P01 (Hassabis et al., 2007a),
who, despite dense amnesia, retained a ca-
pacity for scene construction. We used
fMRI to investigate the brain areas that
were engaged while he successfully con-
structed fictitious scenes. The main ques-
tion was whether his grossly atrophied
hippocampi (each with the volume re-
duced by50%) would be activated. The
remnant of P01’s right hippocampus ex-
hibited increased activity during scene
construction. We also found that scene
construction in P01 was associated with
increased activity in a set of brain areas
that included medial temporal, retro-
splenial, and posterior parietal regions,
and this overlapped considerably with
the network engaged in control partici-
pants performing the same task.
The evidence from P01 suggests that
the intact scene construction ability
observed in some rare hippocampal-
damaged amnesic patients may be sup-
ported by residual function in their
remaining hippocampal tissue (Hassabis et
al., 2007a). This accords with theoretical
frameworks that ascribe a vital role to the
hippocampus in scene construction
(Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Schacter and
Addis, 2007), but is at odds with the view
that construction of fictitious or future
scenesor eventsoccurs independentlyof the
hippocampus (Squire et al., 2010). Of
course, activation of a brain region during
an fMRI scan does not imply that region is
necessary for task performance. However,
P01’s gross hippocampal atrophy, if any-
thing, would militate against activation.
Moreover, he also performed the tasks
without difficulty during scanning (and
during postscan debriefing), as evi-
denced by his appropriately high ratings
of spatial contiguousness for scene trials
compared with low ratings for the object
trials. In addition, P01’s increased right
hippocampal activity persistedwhen trials
rated as similar to a memory were re-
moved from the analysis, suggesting that
this region was responding to scene con-
struction rather than episodic recall.
Overall, therefore, themost parsimonious
conclusion is that P01’s activations were
not random, and that the engagement of
his right hippocampus was related to his
preserved scene constructionability. Further evidence for this comes
from the laterality of his hippocampal activation. Control partici-
pants who imagine fictitious scenes (Hassabis et al., 2007b) or per-
sonal future scenarios (Addis et al., 2007a, 2011;Weiler et al., 2010)
tend to activate the right more than the left hippocampus. P01’s hip-
pocampal activationwas alsoon the right during scene construction, in
line with the pattern in control participants (Hassabis et al., 2007b),
althoughwenote that the controls herewere younger thanP01.
Figure 4. fMRI results. A, Brain areas more active for constructing fictitious scenes compared with imagining single
acontextual objects in patient P01. Upper left, Sagittal image from a “glass brain,” which enables one to appreciate
activations at all locations and levels in the brain simultaneously. Activations are shown on sagittal (upper right), axial
(lower left), and coronal (lower right) images from P01’s structural scan at a threshold of p  0.001 (whole brain,
uncorrected). The color bar indicates the z-scores associated with each voxel. L, Left side of the brain, R, right side of the
brain. B, The same contrast in 21 healthy participants [data from Hassabis et al. (2007b)] shown on the averaged structural
MRI scan of those participants.
Mullally et al. • Scene Construction in Amnesia J. Neurosci., April 18, 2012 • 32(16):5646–5653 • 5651
It has been suggested that the anterior (right) hippocampus is
a key area serving simulations (Addis et al., 2007a, 2011; Schacter
and Addis, 2009; Weiler et al., 2010; Martin et al., 2011). The
hippocampal activation in P01 is mid-posterior in terms of peak
coordinate and extent. This is in line with the prevailing view that
the posterior hippocampus is involved in spatial processing, in
this case supporting the spatial backdrop for the constructed
scenes (Moser andMoser, 1998; Maguire et al., 2000; Hassabis et
al., 2007a). However, any intrahippocampal considerations in
this instance must be treated with caution, because while it is
possible to assign coordinates in stereotactic space to fMRI acti-
vations, what exactly this means for a grossly atrophied hip-
pocampus is not certain. P01’s atrophy is along the entire length
of the hippocampus, with additional evidence of shortening
along the anterior–posterior axis, particularly at the head of the
hippocampi (Aggleton et al., 2005). Attempting to infer localiza-
tion of function within the hippocampus in this context may be
futile, as anterior/posterior distinctions might not now be ob-
served.Nevertheless, what is notable is just howmuchhippocam-
pal volume loss can occur and still the remnant tissue can exhibit
task-related activity. In neuropsychology, it is typically assumed
that volume loss of the magnitude of P01’s renders the hip-
pocampi completely dysfunctional (Gold and Squire, 2005).
However, the evidence from P01 and other studies that have also
reported fMRI activations in obviously atrophic hippocampal
and other tissue during memory tasks (Maguire et al., 2001,
2010b; Rosenbaum et al., 2007; Bowles et al., 2011) challenge this
view.
While P01 was able to construct scenes successfully, the other
patients reported byHassabis et al. (2007a) could not. It might be
interesting to scan those patients while they attempt to construct
scenes, and make a comparison with P01. However, the patients
other than P01 had markedly impaired scene construction abil-
ity, and across-the-board negative scores for spatial coherence,
indicating extreme fragmentation of their internal representation
of scenes (Fig. 1) (Hassabis et al., 2007a). Because they are intel-
ligent and articulate people, they were able to list some relevant
details associated with the scene cue. Despite being able do this,
they had no internal representation of scenes. This finding has
since been replicated and extended in a new group of amnesic
patients (Mullally et al., 2012). In this latter study, the patients
also provided explicit feedback on their attempts to construct
scenes, including: “There is no scene in front of me here. It’s
frustrating because I feel like there should be. I feel like I’m lis-
tening to the radio instead of watching it on the TV. I’m imagin-
ing different things happening but there’s no visual scene
opening out in front of me.” Thus, based on the objective scene
constructionmeasures and the patients’ self-declared problem, it
is clear that despite knowing what was likely to be there, patients
could not construct scenes at all, and consequently had no inter-
nal representation of scenes. This is, therefore, not a graded im-
pairment; but a complete inability to construct and visualize
scenes. If we scan these patients while they cannot perform scene
construction, we simply have no idea what they are doing, and
cannot link fMRI activity to anything task-related. As such, the
data (whether this involves hippocampal activity or not) would
be uninterpretable (Price and Friston, 1999; Price et al., 2006).
Thus, while conceptually desirable to scan the impaired patients,
this cannot provide meaningful results.
Beyond the hippocampus, P01 activated much of the distrib-
uted brain network widely associated with scene construction
and future-thinking (Spreng et al., 2009). When compared di-
rectly with the Hassabis et al. (2007b) control participants in an
exploratory analysis (as they were younger), P01 did not activate
any additional areas, suggesting that his preserved scene con-
struction performance was not bolstered by compensatory up-
regulation of scene construction regions, or the recruitment of
any additional brain areas. Similarly, the opposite contrast
showed no extra areas activated for control participants com-
pared with P01, highlighting the close correspondence between
the brain areas engaged in controls and P01 during successful
scene construction.
This study allows us to conclude that some rare patients with
bilateral hippocampal damage and amnesia may be able to con-
struct novel fictitious and future scenes via intact mechanisms in
the remnant of their right hippocampus. This affirms the close
relationship between the hippocampus and scene construction
(Hassabis and Maguire, 2007, 2009). It also shows that scene
construction, while necessary for autobiographical memory, is
not sufficient. P01 has intact scene construction ability but is
profoundly amnesic for all new and previous experiences. The
scene construction theory posits that while a key function of the
hippocampus is scene construction, other processes and other
brain areas on top of this are required for effective episodic/
autobiographical memory (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007, 2009).
This may involve the additional engagement of the left hip-
pocampus, the upregulation of medial frontal or medial parietal
regions (Hassabis et al., 2007b), or particular modes of connec-
tivity across the memory network that get disrupted by bilateral
hippocampal damage (Maguire et al., 2001; Addis et al., 2007b).
We propose that if a patient with bilateral hippocampal dam-
age cannot construct scenes, then the knock-on effects of this will
include deficits in autobiographical memory, spatial navigation,
and simulation of the future, because scene construction is a basic
‘must-have’ for these functions to operate. Patients like P01, who
retain some residual capacity in remaining hippocampal tissue,
may be able to construct scenes, but this is not sufficient to rescue
their autobiographical memory.What is not possible, we predict,
is a situation where a hippocampal-damaged patient has im-
paired scene construction coupled with fully intact autobio-
Figure 5. Scene construction activations: overlap between P01 and control participants. Red blobs are activations from P01, yellow blobs are the activations for the control participants from
Hassabis et al. (2007b) (who were younger than P01), and orange blobs are where they overlap. Data are shown at p 0.005 for display purposes.
5652 • J. Neurosci., April 18, 2012 • 32(16):5646–5653 Mullally et al. • Scene Construction in Amnesia
graphical memory (that is stringently measured and involves
detailed and vivid reexperiencing of the past), because the latter
does not work without the former.
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